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Abstract: Strategy researchers believe that the better the 
strategic fit or relatedness between the bidding and acquired 
firms, the greater should be the economic gain from the 
merger. Although merger performance has been widely 
researched we recognized that empirical results on merger 
performance are inconclusive and that there are research gaps 
related to geographical settings, time frame and 
methodological approach. Thus, the research question 
examined in our study was to find out if acquisition strategy 
or relatedness of merging companies increases performance of 
the bidding company. Also we considered moderating effect of 
premerger bidder profitability on the performance of the 
merger. Our study predicts that relatedness between merging 
companies has a positive impact on the merger’s performance. 
Results of 49 mergers completed in 2008 in EU member 
countries and Switzerland show that related mergers have 
better merger scores than unrelated mergers. We also predict 
that the impact of the related acquisition strategy becomes 
more positive as bidder premerger performance decreases. 
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Introduction 
 
According to the Thompson One Banker database, in 2010, the total value of 
merger and acquisition transactions amounted to 555 Mil USD which encompassed 
more than 11 thousand deals worldwide. Because of such practical relevance, 
mergers and acquisitions have been studied from multidisciplinary perspectives. This 
field attracted interest of practitioners and academics within a broad range of 
management disciplines taking into account its financial, strategic, behavioral, 
operational and cross-cultural aspects.  
 
Mergers and acquisitions could be explained as strategically planned transactions in 
which the target company and the bidding company jointly create a new entity to 
gain competitive advantage in the market place. This term describes either the 
purchase or sale of corporate assets and shares (an acquisition), or the act of 
combining two or more companies in a single corporate entity (a merger; Ernst and 
Häcker, 2007). On the surface, the distinction in meaning of “merger” and 
“acquisition” may not really matter, since the net result is often the same: two 
companies (or more) that had separate ownership are now operating under the same 
roof, usually to obtain some strategic or financial objective.   
 
According to Marks and Mirvis (2001), less than one quarter of mergers and 
acquisitions achieve their financial objectives, as measured by share value, return on 
investment and post combination profitability. Gugler et al. (2003) compared the 
performance of merging companies with a control group of non-merging firms, 
focusing on profitability and sales. The results show that 43% of all merged 
companies worldwide reported lower profits than comparable non-merged firms. 
Likewise, more than 50% of U.S. mergers earned negative cumulative abnormal 
returns (Agrawal et al., 1992). Given these outcomes, it is not surprising that more 
than half of the merged companies end up being divested (Porter, 1987). Because of 
the negative financial results in post-mergers special emphasis in different research 
has been put on successes and failures of merger and acquisition activities.  
 
According to Straub (2007) and Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) mergers and 
acquisitions have been studied on the basis of several theories. First, there are studies 
on mergers and acquisitions as a method of diversification, from the strategic 
perspective, focusing on both the motives for different types of combinations and the 
performance effects of those combinations. Second, finance scholars have studied 
mergers and acquisitions by focusing on factors such as economies of scale and 
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market power as the motives and on the acquisition performance, based on stock-
market measures. Third, mergers and acquisitions have been studied from the 
viewpoint of organizational behavior as well. Furthermore there is also ‘process’ 
literature which focuses on the important role of the choice of integration strategy 
and the acquisition process itself. This approach emphasizes that the acquisition 
process itself is a factor, in addition to the strategic and organizational fit, that affects 
the outcome.  
 
In our research, we assumed the last mentioned approach also called the strategic 
perspective. The research question in this paper was to find out if acquisition strategy 
of relatedness of merging companies increases the performance of bidding 
companies. Our hypothesis was that relatedness between merging and bidding 
company will have an impact on the merger performance. 
 
Literature Review 
 
In the literature it is often found that the primary purpose of merging and acquiring 
new companies is to improve overall performance by achieving synergy (Lubatkin, 
1983). Synergy is thus, the main motive and the source of value creation in mergers. 
Synergies can be used to explain performance differences among the various merger 
types (Lubatkin, 1983).   
 
There are various typologies of synergies that exist in the literature. For example, 
according to Lubatkin's typology, (1983) there are three basic kinds of synergies, i.e. 
technical economies, pecuniary economies and diversification economies. Technical 
economies occur when the same amounts of inputs, or factors of production, 
produce a higher quantity of outputs. Pecuniary economies are achieved by the 
firm's ability to dictate prices by exerting market power, achieved primarily through 
size and diversification economies, are achieved by improving a firm's performance 
relative to its risk attributes.  
 
Furthermore, Chatterjee (1986) uses broader categories of synergies. First, collusive 
synergy represents the class of scarce resources leading to market power. Second, 
operational synergy represents the class of scarce resources that leads to production 
and/or administrative efficiencies. Lastly, financial synergy represents the class of 
scarce resources that leads to reductions in the cost of capital.  
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Finally, Seth (1990) emphasizes that according to the value-maximizing hypotheses, 
positive synergy, or value creation, may be evidenced and value is created on the 
basis of market power, economies of scale and economies of scope, coinsurance and 
financial diversification. Market power is the ability of a market participant or group 
of participants to control the price, the quantity or the nature of the products sold, 
thereby generating extra profits. Economies of scale can be production-linked or 
functional. Product linked economies of scale may be achieved in the areas of 
purchasing or inventory management in the case of mergers involving companies 
using common raw materials or components. Functional economies of scale may be 
present in other functional areas of a business such as advertising, distribution, 
service networks and research and development. Economies of scope are said to exist 
when the cost of joint production of two goods by a multiproduct company is less 
than the combined costs of production of these goods by two single-product firms. A 
Coinsurance effect appears in a merger between companies whose earning streams 
are less than perfectly correlated. Financial diversification is created when a company 
acquires another with a different business cycle to its own, resulting in its income 
stream being stabilized and the variance of the firm's returns reduced.  
 
Regardless of the description of particular synergies and details in their typologies, 
the mutual feature is that all those synergies provide the basis for value creation 
measured by financial indicators. Companies with better company performance in 
post-merger period are considered to have had better synergy effects.  
 
Acquisition Strategy 
 
Companies are able to create better synergies by implementing acquisition strategy. 
Several researches showed that acquisition strategy had an impact on the company 
performance in the post-merger period (Rumelt, 1947, Ramaswamy, 1997, Altunbas 
and Ibanez, 2004). Acquisition strategies have been usually classified by the US 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of merger classification. According to FTC 
classification, mergers can be horizontal, vertical, product and market concentric or 
conglomerate mergers. A horizontal merger or related diversification takes place 
between companies in the same industry, where the two combining companies 
produce identical products and/or are competitors. Vertical mergers are transactions 
that take place between companies at different levels of the industry value chain and 
occur when two companies combine, each working at different stages in the 
production and distribution of the same good (e.g. buyer-seller, client-supplier). 
Product or market concentric mergers are transactions involving businesses that 
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share similar in production or marketing technologies. Conglomerate takes place 
when the two combining companies operate in unrelated businesses (unrelated 
diversification). 
 
From the theoretical strategic perspective, researchers believe that the better the 
strategic fit between the bidding and acquired firms, the greater should be the 
economic gain from the merger. Strategic fit is described as the level of relatedness of 
merged companies. According to Rumelt (1974) merging companies may be 
considered related 'when a common skill, resource, market or purpose applies to 
each', i.e. if they employ similar production techniques, serve similar markets, use 
similar distribution systems, and employ similar science-based research.  
 
Lubatkin (1988) outlines the advantages of related mergers. First, related mergers 
provide opportunities to reduce cost and/or enhance differentiation through 
exploiting the economies of scale and scope in various operational areas such as 
manufacturing, distribution, and administration. Second, related mergers provide 
the potential for power gains and, by becoming larger, can influence the price of its 
outputs or inputs. 
 
Furthermore in his paper Lubatkin (1988) argues that unrelated mergers involve the 
combination of noncompeting products that utilize different product and market 
technologies, thus offering fewer advantages than related mergers. Therefore, while 
they may provide allocation efficiencies, they will be less able to provide tangible and 
intangible efficiencies and power gains than related mergers. In other words, 
according to Lubatkin (1988), related mergers have greater potential to create 
shareholder value than unrelated mergers. 
 
In studying the impacts of related and unrelated diversification effects on the 
shareholder wealth, two approaches have been used. One stream of research has 
examined the accounting performance of companies following different 
diversification strategies. A second research stream has used market based measures 
and the event study methodology.  
 
An event study is a statistical method to assess the impact of an event on the value of 
a firm. For example, the announcement of a merger between two business entities 
can be analyzed to see whether investors believe that the merger will create or destroy 
value. The basic idea is to find the abnormal return attributable to the event being 
studied by adjusting for the return that stems from the price fluctuation of the 
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market as a whole. The market-based measures intrinsically differ from the 
accounting-based measures as they focus on the present value of future streams of 
income, i.e. on expected value, whereas the latter focus on the past performance. 
Most of the research on takeover performance has focused on the use of market-
based measures. One reason for this is the susceptibility of accounting information 
to managerial manipulation through earnings management and changing accounting 
policies (Stanton, 1987). Also, because of different accounting standards, accounting 
performance measures are harder to compare. 
 
Generally, literature of strategy has argued that companies following related 
diversification strategies should outperform the unrelated diversifiers (Salter and 
Weinhoid, 1979; Rumelt, 1974). Likewise, Walker (2000) investigated strategic 
objectives and stock performance of bidding firms. His analysis shows that bidding 
firm’s shareholders earn positive returns following related acquisitions and negative 
returns following unrelated takeovers. Relatedness in his definition encompass 
geographic expansion (bidding company seeks economies of scale by expanding its 
operations geographically), product line extensions (bidding company seeks 
economies of scope by expanding its product line), and market share increase 
(bidding company buys its competitor).  
 
However, broader empirical evidence is mixed (Lubatkin and O’Neill 1988; Seth, 
1990). For instance, Chatterjee (1986) found that unrelated targets significantly 
outperformed related, non-horizontal targets. On the other hand Lubatkin (1987) 
found no significant difference in the performance levels of related and unrelated 
bidders and targets and concluded that related mergers do not create more value 
than unrelated mergers. So, strategic fit does not have an important effect on success 
of acquisitions. Many mergers are consummated on the premise that the two 
companies have a natural "fit." In reality, this fit is often illusive (Lubatkin and 
O’Neall, 1988). Because of the inconclusive results, we considered that it would be 
interested to test the effect of acquisition strategy on merger performance.  
 
Research gaps  
 
Understanding merger performance on the basis on current review on merger 
research is complex and inconclusive task (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). Since 
researchers are employing both, market-based and accounting metric, covering a 
range of time periods, and using different sample sizes, it is not easy to make 
generalizations on this phenomenon.  
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On the basis on our identification of before mentioned inconclusive evidence in 
current empirical research in mergers’ performance, we recognized certain gaps 
related to geographical settings, time frame and methodological approach (Table 1). 
  
Table 1. Gaps in Previous Researches of Mergers 
Geographical gap Most of the research was done on US and UK companies. 
Time-frame gap Research mostly covers mergers in 1980s and 1990s with few of them at the beginning of 2000. 
Methodological gap Analysis of mergers mostly done by event studies, with focus on market based measures. 
 
Most empirical research in the leading academic research journals has been done in 
Anglo-Saxon geographical settings. For example, in their paper, Tuch and Sullivan 
(2007) present a review of empirical research on the impact of acquisitions on 
company performance. Out of 78 presented empirical studies 51 merger studies are 
from the US market, 24 mergers are from the UK market, and the remaining 3 
merger studies are from the other EU countries. To cover the geographical gap that 
exists in previous research, which encompasses mainly companies in Anglo Saxon 
countries, we selected companies involved in mergers and acquisitions activities 
within EU countries and Switzerland. Switzerland was chosen because of the highest 
number of multinational companies per capita. 
 
Furthermore, research on mergers and acquisitions has been done extensively in 
1980s and 1990s and a relatively low number of studies have been done recently. It 
is believed that mergers performed prior to 1990’s are quite different than those 
done later because of the different economic and other factors outside of the 
company (Kukalis, 2007). For mentioned reasons, and to be able to look at the 
results of two years before and after the merger, we selected mergers that have been 
completed between January 1st and December 31st 2008.  
 
Also the majority of these empirical studies are using event study methodology with 
market based measures. In order to measure mergers’ success, we decided to use 
accounting metrics. As an argument for accounting metrics Ramaswamy (1997) 
emphasizes that some surveys of merger decisions have indicated that managers 
primarily seek to improve profitability through mergers (Ingham, Kran, and 
Lovestam, 1992; Rose, 1989). As profitability measure we used Return on Assets 
(ROA).  
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Model, Data Set and Measures 
 
Model 
 
Our research was developed on studies of Ramaswamy (1997) and Altunbas and 
Ibanez (2004). Ramaswamy (1997) analyzed the impact of relatedness between US 
banks on their performance after the mergers. Altunbas and Ibanez (2004) examined 
the impact of strategic similarities between bidders and targets on post-merger 
financial performance. 
Our model proposes that merger performance is in function of acquisition strategy, 
premerger bidder performance and relative size. Research model was as following:  
 
Merger performance = F (Acquisition strategy, premerger bidder performance, 
relative size). 
 
The research question examined in our study was to find out if acquisition strategy 
or relatedness of merging companies increases the performance of bidding 
companies. The main hypothesis was the following:  
        
H1: Relatedness between merging companies has a positive impact on merger 
performance. 
 
Given the results of previous researches, that included acquisition strategy and 
premerger bidder performance, we assumed that those two variables will have a 
positive effect on merger results. In other words, we expected that the best merger 
results will be presented by companies that had related acquisition strategies and 
lower premerger bidder performance. 
 
H2: Premerger bidder performance moderates the impact of related 
acquisition strategy on merger performance. The impact of related acquisition 
strategy becomes more positive as bidder premerger performance decreases.  
 
Data set 
 
To find relevant mergers and conduct the analysis, the Thompson One Banker 
database on mergers was used. Following criteria were used to screen merging 
companies:  
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(1) Merging companies should be from the EU member countries and 
Switzerland and mergers should be effective in the period between January 
1st and December 31, 2008.  
(2) Mergers in which the bidding companies had between 50 and 100% of 
ownership have been selected. According to International Accounting 
Standards, control is presumed when the parent acquires more than half of 
the voting rights of the entity (Mackenzie et al., 2011). Also, control is the 
power to govern the financial and operating policies of an entity so as to 
obtain benefits from its activities (Mackenzie et al., 2011). Consequently it 
is reasonable to expect that control over subsidiary should impact 
performance of bidding firm. 
(3) In order to obtain financial data, only publicly listed companies had been 
selected.  
(4) We limited the sample with the requirement for market capitalization of 
bidding company above 5 Mill USD.  
 
The resulting sample comprised of 81 mergers. Out of 81 mergers, only 49 mergers 
had full set of required financial data. So a final sample of 49 mergers as a unit of 
analysis (comprising 98 companies) meeting the above conditions was identified. 
 
Measures 
 
As dependent variable, we measured merger performance as the difference between the 
bidding firm's two-year average return on assets (ROA) after the acquisition and the 
average of the ROA of the bidding company two years before the acquisition. We 
considered two years time window to avoid the effect of other economic factors or 
other mergers which could distort the results if we would take longer time span. 
According to the Meeks and Meeks (1981) when using accounting measures in 
assessing impact of merger on efficiency, the problem of extracting the effect of 
efficiency changes on profit from that of changes in bargaining power resulting from 
the merger arises. In their paper, among other profitability measures, ROA is the 
least sensitive in the case of enhancement of leverage or bargaining power resulting 
from a merger. 
 
Acquisition strategy, as an independent variable, was measured by a dummy variable. 
If an acquisition was categorized as a 'horizontal merger' (i.e., related acquisition; 
meaning in the same industry), the variable 'related acquisition' was coded '1'. All 
other mergers (i.e., unrelated acquisition meaning from different industries), were 
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coded '0'. Horizontal or related mergers in our sample encompass all mergers in 
which bidder and target are operating in the same macro industry defined within the 
Thompson One banker database. This approach was used in several other researches 
(e.g. Gerbauld and York, 2007) 
 
Two control variables, namely, average premerger ROA of the bidder for two years 
prior to merger (premerger bidder performance) and the size of a target vis-a-vis the 
bidder (relative size) were used in the analysis. The level of the bidder’s premerger 
performance, measured as its return on assets, is likely to influence post-merger 
performance. Altunbas and Ibanez (2004) argue that if a bidder already possesses a 
high-level of profitability before the merging process, it is more likely that the 
profitability of the new institution will decrease in the short term due to the process 
itself. Alternatively, it is probable that bidders with a lower level of performance will 
manage to increase their profitability after merging with a target. As a consequence, a 
negative relationship between bidders’ premerger performance and post merger 
performance is expected initially. This effect is also known as a “floor-ceiling” effect 
(Ramaswamy, 1997). 
 
Relative size was used as a control variable since various studies show that it may 
impact post merger bidder performance. Some researchers show that larger 
companies might acquire smaller companies to realize scale-related synergies that 
would otherwise be difficult to obtain (Datta et al., 1991; Kusewitt, 1985). 
Chaterjee (1986) states that the smaller the acquired firm, relative to the bidding 
firm, the greater the potential for synergy. Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) state that 
there are a number of reasons why acquiring larger targets might result in better 
post-acquisition performance. First, larger targets are more difficult to assimilate into 
a combined organization, so the pool of potential acquirers is expected to be smaller. 
This may result in acquirers being able to acquire large targets on more advantageous 
terms (Roll, 1986). Secondly, the economic impact of acquiring a larger target is 
likely to have a stronger impact on the post-bid performance of the combined 
company (Bruner 2002). Finally, Moeller et al. (2004) argue that the contrasting 
findings from some studies examining the impact of size arise as a result of the 
different levels of care exercised by smaller bidders in the acquisition process. Small 
acquirers need to be more careful when making a potentially risky bid, as there will 
be a relatively larger economic impact on their company. The authors therefore 
argue that the size effect is due to smaller acquirers rather than to larger targets. Since 
data is not conclusive on the direction of the effect, but research shows impact of 
relative size on the merger performance, this variable is used as control variable. 
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Relative size was calculated as a relative number representing difference in sales 
between target and bidder.  
 
In order to give better understanding to variables and their Operationalization but 
also to connect them with the hypotheses formed, latter table has been prepared 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Operationalization of the Variables and Hypotheses 
Variables Operationalization Hypothesis 
Control variables   
premerger bidder 
performance 
Average premerger ROA of the 
bidder for two years prior to 
merger. 
H2: Premerger bidder 
performance moderates the 
impact of related 
acquisition strategy on 
merger performance. The 
impact of related 
acquisition strategy 
becomes more positive as 
bidder premerger 
performance decreases. 
 
relative size 
Relative number representing 
difference in sales between target 
and bidder. 
Independent variable   
acquisition strategy 
If an acquisition was categorized 
as a 'horizontal merger' (i.e., 
related acquisition; meaning in 
the same industry), the variable 
'related acquisition' was coded '1'. 
All other mergers (i.e., unrelated 
acquisition meaning from 
different industries), were coded 
'0'. 
H1: Relatedness 
between merging 
companies has a 
positive impact on 
merger performance. 
 
Dependent variable   
merger performance 
Difference between the bidding 
firm's two-year average return on 
assets (ROA) after the acquisition 
and the average of the ROA of the 
bidding company two years 
before the acquisition. 
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Results 
 
Prior to testing of hypotheses, we performed correlation analysis which is shown 
with descriptive statistics in Table 3. Generally, we can conclude that after the 
merger performance results are on average lower (x=-4,38) than before the merger 
(x=5,70). 
 
Table 3. Univariate Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 
1. Merger performance -4.38 6.19    2. Acquisition strategy 0.65 0.48 .14   
3. Premerger bidder performance 5.70 8.36 -.32* -.33  4. Relative size 1.38 6.57 .15 .12 -.12 
*p< .05 
 
To test our model we decided to calculate hierarchical regression analysis which is 
usually used when variables are determined by past research and analysis (Field, 
2009; Cohen and Cohen, 1984). Some other researchers also used this hierarchical 
regression analysis to show how an additional set of variables are affecting 
independent variables, besides used control variables (Altunbas and Marques Ibanes, 
2004; Ramaswamy, 1997). Even though data shows respectful standard deviation, 
the OLS regression was run for both models to generate variance inflation factors 
(VIF’s). Average VIF’s for the first model were below 1.014 which is considered 
acceptable.  
 
Second model primarily included two control variables, one independent and 3 
interaction effect but VIF’s and eigenvalues proved that there is a presence of 
multicollinearity. Since there is proof that, in the case of multicollinearity, the 
dropping of the highly collinear variable can often make other variables statistically 
significant (Gujarati, 2002; Allison, 1998), we decided to drop out the relative size 
which had high correlations with other variables and had no predictive effect in the 
first model. Thus the second model was calculated with one control variable, one 
independent variable, and 3 interaction effects. The results of the two regression 
models are showed in the Table 4. 
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Table 4. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Control variables   
premerger bidder performance -0.31* -1,09** 
relative size  0.11      
Independent variables   
acquisition strategy  -0.54** 
acquisition strategy x premerger bidder performance   1.12** 
acquisition strategy x relative size  -0.07 
premerger bidder performance x relative size  -0.30 
   
Model R2 0.12  0.54 
F 3.05  10.25** 
*p< .05         **p< .001 
 
The results of the hierarchical regression analysis provide support for the first study 
hypothesis. The first model shows that the control variable, named relative size as the 
difference in sales between target and bidder does not have a significant impact on 
merger performance. Premerger bidder performance, as the second control variable, 
negatively impacts mergers performance and explains 12% of the variance. The 
merger performance was calculated as the difference of post-merger and premerger 
ROA, thus capturing floor – ceiling effect mentioned earlier. In other words, 
companies that were performing better prior to merging cannot be expected to have 
results after the merger as high as the companies that were performing poorly (Figure 
1). These results are similar to the results of other authors (Harrison et al, 1991; 
Ramaswamy, 1997; Altunbas and Ibanes, 2004). 
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Figure 1. Effect of Premerger Bidder Performance on Merger Performance 
 
 
The second model brings the same effect of the control variables and proves the 
effect of acquisition strategy, explaining additional 42% of the variance. Results also 
show that related mergers have better merger scores than unrelated mergers (Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2. Effect of Acquisition Strategy on Merger Performance 
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that relatedness between merging companies has a positive 
impact on merger performance. Model 2 tests this hypothesis and coefficient for the 
acquisition strategy is negative and strongly significant (b = -0.54; p < .001) which 
indicates support for Hypothesis 1.  
 
Hypothesis 2 in our research predicts a negative interaction between relatedness of 
merging companies and premerger bidder performance expecting that the most 
successful mergers will be among related companies with low premerger bidder 
performance. Results show positive interaction (b = 1.12; p < .001) and therefore 
hypothesis 2 is supported. Figure 3 graphically shows interaction among acquisition 
strategy and premerger bidder performance that was not predicted by the Hypothesis 
2. 
 
Figure 3. Two-Way Interaction between Acquisition Strategy and Premerger Bidder 
Performance 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
One purpose of this research was to deal with found gaps in previous researches. 
Selection of mergers was geographically put in EU countries and Switzerland, only 
completed mergers in 2008 were included in the sample and premerger and post 
merger success was measured in a two year frame prior to and after the merger.  
1.56
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high premerger bidder performance
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Results of the hierarchical regression analysis show that independent variables in the 
second model can explain a significant variance in merger performance. Acquisition 
strategy has an impact on merger performance and generally the more successful are 
companies that are merging with target companies in the same industry. This can be 
explained by creation of collusive and operational synergies in related mergers 
(Chatterjee, 1986). Since related acquisition may involve utilization of economies of 
scale and/or scope both in production and distribution, this may lead to reduced 
costs (i.e. operational synergies), as well as achievement of collusive gains, i.e. 
advantages based on the market power. 
 
Our study also shows that related acquisition strategy and lower premerger 
performance has a positive effect on the merger’s performance as well. On the other 
hand, unrelated strategies combined with lower premerger performance have an even 
better impact on merger performance than related ones do. Our results provide the 
answer that the most successful companies in mergers are those that had lower 
premerger bidder performance and that had unrelated diversification strategy.  
 
These results can be explained by previous research which showed that in unrelated 
acquisitions, value creation occurs and is associated with the coinsurance effect (Seth, 
1990). Some other empirical evidence shows coinsurance effect for conglomerate 
mergers (Kim and McConnell, 1977; Asquith and Kim, 1982; Choi and 
Philippatos, 1983; Shrieves and Pashley, 1984). Coinsurance effect appears in 
merger between companies whose earnings streams are less than perfectly correlated 
i.e. unrelated mergers. In effect, one company can supply funds following the merger 
to make up for the other's concurrent deficiency and thus creating higher cash flows 
(Seth, 1990).  
 
Also better performance of unrelated mergers combined with low premerger bidder 
profitability may be explained with exploiting more financial synergies in unrelated 
mergers than operational and collusive synergies in related acquisitions. According to 
Chatterjee (1986) unrelated mergers are likely to have one form of synergy present, 
i.e. financial synergy. That means that on average a large company has cheaper access 
to capital than a small company does. Unrelated mergers may create financial 
diversification when a company acquires another with a different business cycle to its 
own, its income stream will be stabilized and the variance of the firm's returns 
reduced (Steiner, 1975). 
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Limitations 
 
There are certain limitations which have to be discussed. First problem we will 
mention is the problem of conceptualization and measurement of relatedness. In our 
paper we defined relatedness on the basis of the same macro industry in the 
Thompson One Banker data base because of the availability of this statistic. Also, 
although readily available and widely used, the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) classifications of mergers into groups 
such as horizontal, vertical, product, conglomerate, are limited in their ability to 
provide insights into the complex nature of relatedness (Lubatkin, 1983, 1987). 
Besides of standard product-based definitions of relatedness, it implies connectivity 
of critical organizational and strategic factors such as resource allocation patterns 
(Harrison et al., 1991), management philosophy (Datta, Grant, & Rajagopalan, 
1991), and organizational culture (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; 
Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1993), but a problem arises when researchers have to 
decide on measurements of relatedness and availability of data. 
 
Also, as Meeks and Meeks (1981) also stressed in their research, limitation arise 
when using accounting measures as a metric of merger success. The central issue is 
distinguishing the effect of the profit of efficiency changes, resulting from a merger, 
from that of changes in bargaining power. For instance, if the participants' 
bargaining power is on average enhanced by a merger, then profitability could rise 
even though efficiency remained unchanged or actually fell. 
 
One of the limitations could be the number of mergers used. As noted earlier, in our 
research we only focused on 49 mergers out of 81 because for the remaining number 
of mergers we could not find the needed data. If we would have this data, maybe the 
results would show some other effects.  
 
Finally, limitation may be related to the measurement time frame. It can be argued 
that two years is not long enough for synergistic gains of merger to materialize, but 
we were forced to limit the time frame to two years to limit probability of further 
mergers in the sample. Therefore, adding additional years would have violated the 
"clean data" criterion suggested by Choi and Philipatos (1983) and Lubatkin (1987). 
Future research could compare different regions and countries during a longer period 
of time to give a more conclusive result. 
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